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PROVIDING EQUAL INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITY VIA 
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT SECTION 13(F) 
RYAN M. CARPENTER 
In 1975, Congress amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
incorporating section 13(f) on Periodic Reporting requirements of 
institutional investment managers.  The law mandates that institutional 
investors file a holdings report, known as Form 13F, with the Securities 
and Exchange Commission for public distribution.  The law provides filers 
with confidential treatment when in the public interest. 
This Note argues that the SEC has not implemented section 13(f) in a 
way that achieves Congress’s professed goal of providing more egalitarian 
access to information about the financial and security markets, both by 
neglecting to effectively administer the program and failing to promulgate 
a meaningful standard for exemption.  It also argues that this failure is 
detrimental to the efficiency of the securities markets.  It makes the case 
that the SEC should more deliberately balance the competitive interest of 
institutional investment managers with the public interest in transparent 
and efficient markets when administering the regulation. 
By harmonizing section 13(f) with existing securities regulation 
doctrine, this Note ultimately arrives at suggestions for improvement, 
namely that the law be deployed as a mechanism for sharing gains with the 
market and that confidential treatment be granted only when necessary to 
avoid inflicting losses on an institution, as opposed to protecting future 
potential gain.  This Note also makes corollary suggestions that modernize 
the administration of the law and provide for more rigorous enforcement 
policies. 
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PROVIDING EQUAL INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITY VIA 
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT SECTION 13(F) 
RYAN M. CARPENTER* 
But the most common and durable source of factions, has 
been the various and unequal distribution of property.  Those 
who hold, and those who are without property, have ever 
formed distinct interests in society. . . . The regulation of 
these various and interfering interests forms the principal 
task of modern Legislation . . . .1 
—James Madison, The Federalist No. 10 
The distribution of wealth and income, and the hierarchies of 
authority, must be consistent with both the liberties of equal 
citizenship and equality of opportunity.2 
—John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Suppose that Cate is an investment adviser who, in the process of 
managing her clients’ accounts, diligently follows all of the companies in 
which she invests.  She takes in relevant financial media daily, reads 
analyst reports, and is sure to review all of their regulatory filings.  She 
uses this information to adjust her strategies accordingly.  Let us assume 
that many of Cate’s client accounts have long been invested in the stock of 
Monolith, Inc., an industrial conglomerate with a revered CEO, and she 
prizes the investment as a core holding because of its track record of steady 
returns, its long-term approach to growth, and its policies of open 
disclosure to its shareholders.  As a result of Monolith’s successful track 
record in its own operations and in partnering with other companies, 
experts and market media tend to dwell on its every move.   
                                                                                                                          
* University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2014; Princeton University, A.B. 
2005.  I would like to express sincere gratitude to James Kwak for his thoughtful guidance.  Thanks 
also to Kip Hall for challenging me to take up this subject at the outset.  Casey Smith, Cassandra 
Beckman Widay, Jeffrey Wisner, and the rest of the Connecticut Law Review staff provided valuable 
editorial assistance for which I am grateful.  As always, affectionate appreciation is due to my wife, 
Lauren, for her enduring love and support.  This is dedicated to Cadence—may your life be rich with 
opportunity. 
1 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 59 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
2 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 61 (1971).  
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Suppose now that Monolith makes a sizeable purchase of stock issued 
by a troubled corporation, First Icarian Bank (“FIB”), for its own portfolio.  
After making a series of bad investments in the asset-backed securities 
market, FIB is cash-strapped and its share price has declined accordingly.  
The market assumes that there is a decent chance that it will file for 
bankruptcy.  Monolith’s CEO believes that FIB is actually a turnaround 
story about to happen, but does not want to telegraph his company’s 
investments to the market.  At times in the past, Monolith’s eventual 
acquisition of a company could be traced back to a large purchase of 
common stock.  The CEO does not want others buying up FIB stock, 
thereby forcing its market price back up and ruining what he sees as a 
prospective opportunity for heady gain.   
The quarter is closing soon, however, and his company must file Form 
13F with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or the 
“Commission”), which would publicly disclose this information.  Happily 
for Monolith, it can apply for a temporary exemption from reporting its 
FIB holdings on Form 13F.  In the meantime and—if approved—for a set 
period afterwards, Monolith does not have to tell anybody, potentially 
including its shareholders, that it has made the investment.  Monolith 
receives the SEC’s permission to withhold information of its investment in 
FIB stock from the public for twelve months from the date of purchase.   
Cate, like many other active investors, has done her own independent 
research on FIB, which has also been followed closely by the financial 
press.  She has concluded that the stock is a poor investment and that it 
amounts to nothing more than a reckless and speculative gamble.  Suppose 
that Jack, a longtime FIB shareholder, comes to the same conclusion and, 
fearing that the shares might soon be completely worthless, sells his stock 
in the open market for a deep loss.  Because Monolith received 
confidential treatment regarding its Form 13F requirement, neither Cate 
nor Jack knew about its investment.  If FIB collapses in six months, 
inflicting financial losses upon Monolith, Inc., Cate will suffer a 
corresponding decline in the value of the shares in her accounts.  She had 
no opportunity to avoid this loss.  If FIB survives and its share price 
rebounds, then Jack will have cut and run without understanding all 
material aspects of the company’s outlook.  
Section 13(f) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19343 requires 
companies that manage investment funds to file Form 13F with the SEC on 
a quarterly basis.4  The filing is required from companies that exercise 
investment discretion over accounts holding certain securities that have an 
aggregate fair market value of at least $100 million on the last trading day 
                                                                                                                          
3 15 U.S.C. § 78m(f) (2012). 
4 Id. 
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of any month of the preceding calendar year.5  Congress enacted section 
13(f) in 1975 to increase the public availability of information regarding 
the purchase, sale, and holding of securities by institutional investors.6 
The text and legislative history of the statute make clear Congress’s 
intent that information collected under section 13(f) be disseminated to the 
public as promptly as possible.7  At the same time, it conceded that 
sometimes “disclosure of certain types of information could have harmful 
effects, not only on a filing investment manager, but also on the investors 
whose assets are under its management.”8  To strike a balance between 
these competing interests, section 13(f)(3) authorizes the Commission to 
“delay or prevent the public disclosure” of information “as it determines to 
be necessary or appropriate in the public interest” or for the protection of 
investors.9  Part II of this Note will provide an overview of section 13(f) 
reporting requirements, the confidential treatment exception process, and 
its policy concerns.  It will also introduce the core of the argument: the 
section 13(f) confidential treatment reporting exemption should aim to 
allow money managers to avoid losses in limited and extraordinary 
situations wherein demanding compliance with regulatory reporting 
requirements would, in itself, cause losses.  It should otherwise require 
disclosure, even when that would result in sharing some gains derived from 
privately funded research with the public.  
In order to fully understand the function of the disclosure requirement 
and the exemption, this Note will then examine and appraise the practical 
mechanics and underlying theory behind the regulation itself.  This is to 
uncover the ways in which section 13(f) reporting and its accompanying 
confidential treatment exception present problems.  First of all, there are a 
number of practical shortcomings associated with application and 
administration of the exemption that have received unfavorable political 
and media attention.  The lack of effective administrative processes and, 
perhaps more importantly, the failure of the SEC to use the information 
gathered by the report in a meaningful way cancel out much of the effect 
that section 13(f) was intended to have on financial markets.  Instead, 
investment managers are left with yet another compliance cost without a 
corresponding market benefit.  These concerns will be examined in Part 
III.   
Secondly, there are well-supported theoretical problems with section 
                                                                                                                          
5 Id. 
6 Filing and Reporting Requirements Relating to Institutional Investment Managers, Exchange 
Act Release No. 34-14852, 43 Fed. Reg. 26,700, 26,701 (June 22, 1978). 
7 S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 87 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 265. 
8 Section 13(f) Confidential Treatment Requests, SEC Guidance Letter, 1998 WL 35318911, at 
*2 (June 17, 1998) [hereinafter 1998 Guidance Letter]. 
9 15 U.S.C. § 78m(f)(3). 
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13(f) confidential treatment.  The vagueness of the controlling “public 
interest” standard, particularly in its oft-avowed purpose of “protecting 
investors,” is easily misdirected and ultimately unsound as a policy 
justification.  The public interest would be more expeditiously served if the 
Commission were to focus on rules that furthered ex ante informational 
equity that advanced market efficiency and liquidity.  In Part IV, this Note 
will take a look at the public interest in informational equity through the 
lens of the smaller investor and consider also the countervailing interest of 
institutional asset managers who invest heavily in research and strategy.   
The best tack, I argue, is to find the middle ground: economic 
principles and policy considerations demand that we preserve the fruits of 
engaging successfully in informational competition for those who spend 
their resources seeking them, but not in perpetuity.  Section 13(f) is the 
device by which institutional investors are eventually required to cede what 
residual advantage remains in the information they have gathered for the 
benefit of market efficiency and fairness over the long term, but only after 
they have acted on it.  In this way, not only does the regulation strive to 
provide economic efficiency, but it also acts to align the law with public 
interest and the legislative intent of section 13(f).  
With these practical and theoretical concerns in mind, we will move to 
Part V, where I seek to integrate section 13(f) and its confidential treatment 
provision into the existing body of securities regulation doctrine as a 
coherent whole.  While section 13(f) is an underdeveloped and unsung 
provision within the canon of securities laws, it is clear that it nonetheless 
offers something distinct and important to the body of regulation.  This 
perspective on the regulation should color our understanding of the 
confidential treatment allowance and underscore that it should only be 
available in limited circumstances when not providing it would impose a 
dilemma forcing the investment manager to choose between similarly 
undesirable options: (a) not transact against the firm’s better judgment or 
(b) risk subsequent loss as a result of disclosure.10  Such economically non-
neutral regulations are to be discouraged to the extent that they would 
inform an investment managers’ decision-making on matters that should be 
dictated predominantly by economic substance.  At the same time, liberally 
permitting disclosure exemptions for unsubstantiated or insufficient 
reasons might have the converse effect of allowing the investment manager 
to gain by unjust enrichment.  
                                                                                                                          
10 This is, perhaps, most likely to occur in situations where the investment manager has 
established a large position in some security and decides that she wants to liquidate the asset.  If news 
of her liquidation leaks into the market, through regulatory disclosure or otherwise, it may cause other 
investors to run on the stock, forcing her to sustain losses before she is able to exit the position.  
Because this is likely to have deterrent effects on investment in small or distressed companies that 
would otherwise present worthwhile opportunities, the availability of the exemption here is sensible. 
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II.  A REVIEW OF EXCHANGE ACT SECTION 13(F) 
A. Section 13(f) Strikes a Balance Between Institutional Investors’ 
Competitive Interests and the Public Interest in Transparent Markets 
In 1968, Congress became concerned with the effects that transactions 
by large-scale institutional investment management companies were 
having on the stock market.11  Its concern was rooted in a sudden increase 
in trading volume in American securities markets, which the paper-driven 
market infrastructure could not bear, resulting in sharp declines in stock 
prices and a financial industry crisis.12  In response, Congress passed the 
Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 “to provide greater protection 
for customers of registered brokers and dealers and members of national 
securities exchanges.”13  Additionally, both houses embarked upon the first 
exhaustive independent congressional examinations of the securities 
market since the studies completed in the early 1930s, which had resulted 
in the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the 
formation of the SEC.14   
As a result of the examination reports, Congress ordered the SEC to 
study and investigate such transactions on a continuing basis “in order to 
determine the effect of those activities upon the maintenance of fair and 
orderly securities markets, the stability of those markets, and the interests 
of issuers of securities and of the public.”15  Citing “gaps in information 
about the purchase, sale and holdings of securities by major classes of 
institutional investors,” the SEC recommended that Congress empower it 
with the capacity to require institutional investment managers to report and 
disclose their holdings and transactions on a regular and ongoing basis.16  
Concurrently, the President’s Commission on Financial Structure and 
Regulation in 1971, as well as the Senate Subcommittee on Securities in 
1973, similarly recommended improved disclosure by institutional 
investors.17   
In response, Congress adopted section 13(f) of the Securities Exchange 
                                                                                                                          
11 Filing and Reporting Requirements Relating to Institutional Investment Managers, 43 Fed. 
Reg. at 26,701. 
12 Philip A. Loomis, Jr., Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, The Securities Acts Amendments of 
1975, Self-Regulation and the National Market System, Address Before the Joint Securities Conference 
(Nov. 18, 1975), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1975/111875loomis.pdf. 
13 Pub. L. No. 91-598, 84 Stat. 1636, 1636. 
14 Loomis, supra note 12, at 3.  
15 Filing and Reporting Requirements Relating to Institutional Investment Managers, 43 Fed. 
Reg. at 26,701. 
16 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
17 Id.  
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Act of 1934 as part of the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975.18  The law 
added to the pre-existing body of section 13, the unambiguous purpose of 
which is “[t]o substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy 
of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of business ethics in 
the securities industry.”19  The reporting system called for by section 13(f) 
was “intended to create in the Commission a central repository of historical 
and current data about the investment activities of institutional investment 
managers,” and thereby advance two separate congressional objectives.20   
First, the disclosures would vastly increase the amount of market data 
available, allowing for the effective study of how large investment 
management companies affect the equity market and consideration of the 
public policy implication of these effects.21  Secondly, in making the 
Commission responsible for gathering, processing, and disseminating this 
data, a uniform reporting standard and centralized database would be 
possible.22  The legislative history for section 13(f) indicates that Congress 
intended for the immediate and orderly dissemination of information about 
institutional investment managers’ holdings and transactions to the general 
public because it would “stimulate a higher degree of confidence among all 
investors in the integrity of our securities markets.”23  It was concerned 
with utilizing the methods of public dissemination that would be most 
useful “to investors, issuers, and other institutional investment 
managers.”24  Congress also directed the Commission to use the 
information, in consultation with other regulatory agencies, to fulfill 
regulatory responsibilities in a way that achieved uniform, nonduplicative 
reporting by investment managers, in turn minimizing the cost and burden 
associated with regulatory compliance.25 
                                                                                                                          
18 Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.13f-1 (1979) (implementing section 
13(f) requirements as Rule 13f-1); 17 C.F.R. § 249.325 (adopting Form 13F and issuing instructions for 
completing the form). 
19 Spilker v. Shayne Labs., Inc., 520 F.2d 523, 525 (9th Cir. 1975) (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains 
Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
20 Filing and Reporting Requirements Relating to Institutional Investment Managers, 43 Fed. 
Reg. at 26,701. 
21 Id. 
22 S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 87 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 265.  
23 Id. at 82; see also Div. of Inv. Mgmt., Frequently Asked Questions About Form 13F, U.S. SEC. 
& EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/13ffaq.htm (last modified Oct. 
10, 2013) [hereinafter FAQ About Form 13F] (“Congress passed Section 13(f) of the Securities 
Exchange Act in 1975 in order to increase the public availability of information regarding the securities 
holdings of institutional investors.  Congress believed that this institutional disclosure program would 
increase investor confidence in the integrity of the United States securities markets.” (citation 
omitted)). 
24 Filing and Reporting Requirements Relating to Institutional Investment Managers, 43 Fed. 
Reg. at 26,704. 
25 Id. at 26,701. 
 2013] PROVIDING EQUAL INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITY 771 
On June 15, 1978, the SEC rolled out Rule 13f-126 in Exchange Act 
Release No. 34-14852, implementing the disclosure program mandated by 
section 13(f), effective July 31, 1978.27  Mechanically, Rule 13f-1 works 
by requiring that every institutional investment manager that exercises 
investment discretion with respect to accounts holding equity securities of 
a class described in section 13(d)(1) of the Exchange Act that have an 
aggregate fair market value of at least $100 million file “reports with the 
Commission, in such form, for such periods, and at such times after the end 
of such periods as the Commission, by rule, may prescribe, but in no event 
shall such reports be filed for periods longer than one year or shorter than 
one quarter.”28  The filing document is known as Form 13F.29   
Institutional investment managers are required to file a Form 13F for 
each calendar quarter, no later than forty-five days after its close.30  The 
report must include, as of the last day of the reporting period, “the name of 
the issuer and the title, class, CUSIP number, number of shares or principal 
amount, and aggregate fair market value or cost or amortized cost of each 
other security” with respect to which the institutional investment manager 
exercises investment discretion.31  The securities that must be reported 
generally include exchange-traded or NASDAQ-quoted stocks, shares of 
exchange-traded funds (ETFs), equity options and warrants, shares of 
closed-end investment companies, and certain convertible debt securities.32  
This list of includable securities intentionally neglects a range of popular 
financial instruments.33  For example, investment managers neither have to 
report positions in bonds, debentures, or shares issued by open-end 
investment (i.e., mutual fund) companies,34 nor report or net out any short 
sale positions in includable security types.35   
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 
2010 contains, however, a yet-to-be implemented provision amending 
section 13(f) to require certain disclosures of short positions by 
                                                                                                                          
26 17 C.F.R. § 240.13f-1 (1979). 
27 Filing and Reporting Requirements Relating to Institutional Investment Managers, 43 Fed. 
Reg. at 26,705. 
28 15 U.S.C. § 78m(f)(1) (2012). 
29 17 C.F.R. § 249.325 (2012). 
30 FAQ About Form 13F, supra note 23. 
31 17 C.F.R. § 240.13f-1(A). 
32 FAQ About Form 13F, supra note 23. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id.; see also Official List of Section 13(f) Securities Users, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION (June 18, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/13flists.htm (publishing a file 
for each calendar quarter containing the list of securities reportable under section 13(f) to assist with 
the preparation of reports). 
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institutional investment managers.36  This amendment, section 929X, 
mandates the disclosure of short sale positions to the SEC, which will 
make such information available to the public, as with other section 13(f) 
data.37  There is some disagreement among industry participants and 
interest groups, at the time of this writing, as to whether the SEC would be 
publicizing the short sale data in an aggregated format or on a firm-specific 
basis.38 
The Commission intended, in establishing the types of holdings that 
were material for the purpose of this disclosure in 1978, to limit the 
reportable stock positions to those that have the potential to impact U.S. 
financial markets.39  Moreover, the SEC expressly acknowledged that it 
had reflected on the influence that the rule might have on competition: it 
concluded that disclosure would not significantly burden competition and, 
additionally, “that any possible resulting competitive burden will be 
outweighed by, and is necessary and appropriate to achieve, the benefits of 
this information to investors.”40   
The Commission acknowledged those benefits again, about half a year 
later, when it revised the rule to require quarterly reporting rather than 
merely annual reports.41  Market participants had stated that more frequent 
reporting would be invaluable to trading desks, facilitate increased market 
liquidity, and allow for competitive “comparison shopping” of investment 
managers.42  Based on this input, the SEC concluded that quarterly filings 
would be in the public interest and, furthermore, the “continuous flow of 
information” demanded by the increased reporting rate would also be 
useful for formulating policy.43  
What would go wrong without section 13(f)?  Congress appears to 
have been concerned with the aggregation of information by those market 
participants who have the means to purchase such an advantage.  That is, 
market participants with superior resources can deploy them to build up 
                                                                                                                          
36 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929X, 
124 Stat. 1376, 1870–71 (2010).  
37 Id.   
38 See, e.g., Letter from Richard H. Baker, President & Chief Exec. Officer, Managed Funds 
Ass’n, to James A. Brigagliano, Deputy Dir., Div. of Trading & Markets, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 
(Feb. 7, 2011), available at http://www.managedfunds.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/2.7.11-
MFA.Letter.on_.Short_.Sale_.Disclosures.under_.Section.929X.of_.Dodd_.Frank_.pdf. 
39 See Filing and Reporting Requirements Relating to Institutional Investment Managers, 
Exchange Act Release No. 34-14852, 43 Fed. Reg. 26,700, 26,703 (June 22, 1978) (announcing that 
the establishment of a de minimis exemption and the decision not to exempt foreign holders of U.S. 
stocks are both decisions controlled by a concern for isolating the report to holdings that may impact 
the market). 
40 Id. at 26,705. 
41 Filing and Reporting Requirements Relating to Institutional Investment Managers, Exchange 
Act Release No. 34-15461, 1979 WL 173407, at *2 (Jan. 5, 1979). 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
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substantial market advantages by essentially creating non-public 
information and trading on it until it is, one way or another, fully 
incorporated into the security’s price.  This result undercuts confidence in 
public markets because such privatized informational advantages will 
result in concealing transactional opportunities that the public would 
otherwise be able to participate in or, worse yet, would be on the losing 
side of until the news is made public.  Once the news is announced, the 
average investor is likely to be aggravated and discouraged by the 
systematic disadvantages that deprived her of an opportunity or caused her 
losses.  As President Ford remarked upon signing the Securities Acts 
Amendments of 1975 into law: “Public confidence is a vital ingredient if 
our capital markets are to continue to attract a wide variety of investors.  
Though large institutions have become increasingly active as owners and 
traders of securities, individuals still represent the backbone of the 
American capital system.”44  Even now, when institutions execute the vast 
majority of daily stock exchange transactions, the market’s inherently open 
and public nature demands that regulators remain committed to a 
framework of rules and systematic safeguards that preserve the interest of 
public participants generally and avoid the privatization of all advantage.   
Concern for individual investors is economically understandable.  
Rational investors would be deterred from participating in markets that too 
strongly favor an elite group of large money managers and thereby deprive 
them of the opportunity to partake in positive investment outcomes, 
forcing them to invest their money with the money managers that hold the 
informational advantages and pay the fees required to do so.  Moreover, in 
the context of public companies, a failure to report specific equity holdings 
to the investing public results in misleading shareholders—if investors do 
not know what assets and liabilities underlie a security, they will not be 
able to make an informed assessment of the issuing company’s financial 
health and accurately price it.45   
Some might argue that if such disclosures were not required by the 
public company reporting requirements, Congress must have decided that 
they were unimportant or best left confidential.  It seems more likely, 
though, that Congress meant to supplement the cursory securities holding 
disclosures included in the consolidated financial statements with the more 
                                                                                                                          
44 President Gerald R. Ford, Statement on Signing the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975 (June 
5, 1975), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=4970. 
45 While public companies are bound to report financial results as part of the annual (10-K) and 
quarterly (10-Q) filings required by the Exchange Act, such reports do not require a comprehensive 
statement of securities held by the reporting entity.  15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)–(c) (2012).  Oftentimes, the 
reporter will list several of its largest security holdings and then clump the rest together in a single line 
item marked “Other.”  See, e.g., Berkshire Hathaway Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 74 (Dec. 
31, 2010) (listing equity holdings in four corporations valued at approximately $34 billion followed by 
a single line for “other” equities worth over $26 billion).  
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granular Form 13F for those companies that meet the Rule 13f-1 
qualifications and for which such holdings would be a material aspect of 
their financial health.  While disclosure of information is likely to level the 
playing field and provide the fruits of institutional investor research to 
individual investors for little to no real cost, the end-of-quarter-plus-forty-
five-days reporting period should allow an institutional investor enough 
time to begin implementing a new investment strategy and, if its thesis is 
correct, to profit from it.  It may not have sufficient time to maximize those 
profits, but the lost excess return is a cost of operating in efficient markets. 
The legislative background and the administrative implementation of 
section 13(f) indicate that, while it expressly stands for rather broad free 
market principles like efficiency and fairness, Congress and the SEC 
implicitly meant for the regulation to grant expansive access to institutional 
investor information on controlled terms that would strike a balance 
between the institutions’ desire to keep such information confidential for 
competitive reasons and the public interest in keeping regulators and 
individual investors abreast of the forces that are driving the markets—
thereby preventing investment management oligopoly and deception of 
investors.   
B.  Confidential Treatment of Section 13(f) Information Allows Investors to 
Avoid Incurring Investment Losses in Connection with Reporting 
Exemptions from section 13(f) reporting requirements are available 
from the SEC under subsection 2.46  Confidential treatment under this 
provision was to be permitted in situations where the Commission 
determines it “necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the 
protection of investors.”47  Congress made the exemption available because 
it recognized that some instances of disclosure might not be in the public 
interest, in that revealing the information could visit “harmful effects” 
upon an investment manager and the investors whose assets are under the 
firm’s control.48   
In order to succeed in obtaining a confidential treatment exemption, 
institutional investors must submit a request for confidential treatment  
(“CT Request”) identifying the specific information that they would like to 
refrain from disclosing as well as the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
provisions upon which the request is based, and including a statement and 
analysis of the grounds for the applicability of such provisions.49  If the 
filing firm’s request is granted, such firm will receive confidential 
                                                                                                                          
46 15 U.S.C. § 78m(f)(2). 
47 Id. § 78m(f)(3). 
48 1998 Guidance Letter, supra note 8, at *2. 
49 17 C.F.R. § 240.24b-2 (2012). 
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treatment with respect to the specified positions for a period of three, six, 
nine, or twelve months measured from the filing date.50  CT Requests that 
do not provide sufficient basis for the request or provide only conclusory 
or generalized information are to be denied.51 
In 1998, the SEC provided an explanation of the requirements for CT 
Request filers in a guidance letter, particularly in order to explain that such 
“requests can be granted only under certain limited circumstances.”52  The 
letter explains that the Exchange Act and the applicable FOIA provisions 
require that confidential treatment only be made available in instances 
where the investment manager establishes “that confidential treatment is in 
the public interest.”53  Congress acknowledged two categories of securities 
information that would be in the public interest to not disclose in Form 13F 
filings:  
(1) information that would identify securities held by the 
account of a natural person or certain estates or trusts; and (2) 
information that would reveal an investment manager’s 
program of acquisition or disposition that is ongoing both at 
the end of a reporting period and at the time that the 
investment manager’s Form 13F is filed.54 
Section 13(f)’s legislative history reveals that the second scenario was 
of concern because Congress believed that “generally it is in the public 
interest to grant confidential treatment to an ongoing investment strategy of 
an investment manager [when] [d]isclosure of such strategy would impede 
competition and could cause increased volatility in the market place.”55  
The SEC has supplemented the categories of information eligible for 
confidential treatment under its statutory authority with two additional 
types of information: (1) open risk arbitrage positions; and (2) investment 
strategies that utilize block positioning.56   
                                                                                                                          
50 FAQ About Form 13F, supra note 23. 
51 1998 Guidance Letter, supra note 8, at *2. 
52 Id. at *1. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at *2. 
55 S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 87 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 265.  
56 1998 Guidance Letter, supra note 8, at *2.  “[T]he term ‘risk arbitrage’ refers to the risking of 
capital in connection with a proposed merger, acquisition, tender offer, or similar transaction involving 
recapitalization . . . . The term applies only to transactions effected after the public announcement of 
the deal and before completion or termination of the deal.”  Requests for Confidential Treatment Filed 
by Institutional Investment Managers, Exchange Act Release No. 34-21539, 49 Fed. Reg. 48,318, 
48,319 (Dec. 12, 1984).  Rule 3b-8(c) of the Exchange Act defines block positioning as buying “a 
block of stock with a current market value of $200,000 or more in a single transaction, or in several 
transactions at approximately the same time, from a single source” with reasonable certainty that such 
transactions could not be completed with another party on similar or better terms and selling the block 
stock “as rapidly as possible commensurate with the circumstances.”  17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-8(c) (2012).  
Oftentimes, this type of transaction is done directly between large institutional buyers and sellers 
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The SEC’s 1998 guidance letter outlined five general requirements for 
a successful confidential treatment request under the common “program of 
acquisition or disposition” exception.57  In October 2013, the SEC’s 
Division of Investment Management released additional guidance to 
describe further information that it identified as “particularly helpful in 
reaching an informed decision on whether delaying or preventing public 
disclosure is necessary or appropriate in the public interest and for the 
protection of investors or to maintain fair and orderly markets.”58  The 
2013 guidance update describes specific information that is helpful in 
successfully supporting each of the general requirements outlined in the 
1998 guidance letter.59  The releases do not ascribe any levels of priority or 
relative weighting to the many factors considered.  
Taken together, the two guidance releases provide a general sense of 
the information that the Commission would like to review in connection 
with a CT Request for reason of an ongoing acquisition or disposition 
program.  First, the applicant investment manager must show that its 
company or fund is following a specific program by detailing measures 
taken during the most recent quarter toward effectuating the program and 
information regarding the program’s goal.60  The description of the 
program “should be specific to each Reportable Security covered” by the 
request, and discuss its timing, level of progress, and “ultimate goal” in 
terms of percentage of each issuer’s total outstanding securities.61  
Second, the applicant must show that the program is “ongoing both at 
the end of the quarter and at the time of the filing.”62  This should include 
evidence of recent purchases or sales in the securities subject to the CT 
Request and, if applicable, why a program should be considered “ongoing 
during any periods when no transactions occurred.”63 
Third, the applicant must present evidence that disclosure of the 
securities positions in question would reveal the manager’s investment 
strategy by showing “how the purchases or sales of particular securities 
that took place during the quarter relate to the manager’s overall 
                                                                                                                          
outside of the auspices of a national securities exchange so as to minimize the effects of the trade on the 
market price.  Block Trade, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/blocktrade.asp (last 
visited Nov. 20, 2013).   
57 1998 Guidance Letter, supra note 8, at *3–4. 
58 DIV. OF INV. MGMT., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, GUIDANCE UPDATE NO. 2013-08: FORM 13F 
CONFIDENTIAL TREATMENT REQUESTS BASED ON A CLAIM OF ONGOING ACQUISITION/DISPOSITION 
PROGRAM 2 (2013) [hereinafter 2013 GUIDANCE UPDATE], available at 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/guidance/im-guidance-update-filing-requirements-for-certain-
electronic-communications.pdf.  
59 Id. at 3–4. 
60 1998 Guidance Letter, supra note 8, at *3. 
61 2013 GUIDANCE UPDATE, supra note 58, at 3. 
62 1998 Guidance Letter, supra note 8, at *4. 
63 2013 GUIDANCE UPDATE, supra note 58, at 3–4. 
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investment strategy” and how the public would be able to discern the thrust 
of the strategy from those transactions.64  In order to support a claim that 
disclosure would reveal a broader investment program, the request must 
consider what information is already deemed to be public, why compliance 
with the regulation would reveal the program given the “historical 
snapshot” nature of Form 13F, and “how the public would discern from 
Form 13F data the Institutional Manager’s intent” to transact in specific 
reportable securities in the future.65 
Fourth, the applicant must analyze how the disclosure would affect the 
underlying securities holdings in order to demonstrate that the failure to 
receive the “confidential treatment would present a likelihood of 
substantial harm to the manager’s competitive position.”66  This section of 
the CT Request should detail the likelihood that and manner in which the 
filer’s “competitive position” in a security would be substantially harmed 
by providing “a description and comparison of any prior instances of 
market reaction to the Institutional Manager’s public disclosure of its 
position in an issuer.”67 
Lastly, the request must specify the period of time for which 
confidential treatment is requested.68  This is to include an explanation of 
the “projected timeframe” for achieving the “ultimate objective,” whether 
there are other related regulatory disclosures that might impact the 
timeframe for confidential treatment, and “any other factors that may be 
relevant.”69   
It is apparent from these guidelines that the SEC wants a lot of 
information from CT Request filers.  It is not clear, though, that it is 
evaluating the information in a methodical way.  More puzzling still, the 
Commission has yet to specifically express its rationale as to how granting 
CT Requests regarding a plan of acquisition or disposition can be in the 
public interest, advance the general “protection of investors,” or further the 
administration of fair and orderly markets. 
What would go wrong without the availability of a confidential 
treatment exemption for Form 13F?  Large investors would likely point out 
that mass disclosure of their positions generally disincentivizes them from 
doing market research and investing in companies at all.  If they cannot 
earn excess returns by uncovering, through honest means, financially 
relevant information not yet incorporated into the value of a company’s 
securities, then they will stop doing it altogether.  Considering that large 
                                                                                                                          
64 1998 Guidance Letter, supra note 8, at *4. 
65 2013 GUIDANCE UPDATE, supra note 58, at 3. 
66 1998 Guidance Letter, supra note 8, at *4. 
67 2013 GUIDANCE UPDATE, supra note 58, at 4. 
68 1998 Guidance Letter, supra note 8, at *3. 
69 2013 GUIDANCE UPDATE, supra note 58, at 4. 
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investors play an important role in assessing the true value of corporate 
enterprises and, accordingly, the securities that they issue, it would be 
generally unwise to enforce laws that completely strip the reward out of the 
work they do and the risks they take.   
For a number of institutional investors who have long track records of 
success and broad followings in the financial media, large transactions in 
the stock of companies are highly scrutinized and, often, blindly copied by 
large numbers of bandwagon jumpers.  If the investor’s following is large 
and voracious, and especially when it includes other institutional 
managers,70 this following can cost her the fruits of her research.  She may 
not be able to build a large position or liquidate an existing one before the 
herd of smaller copycats has rushed into or out of the stock, impacting the 
price adversely for her and potentially ruining the opportunity that she had 
uncovered.  This scenario could result in increased volatility as well, 
because the investor would be incentivized to liquidate or build large 
positions more quickly than she normally would, rather than in a manner 
that would minimize impact on market values. 
With these effects in mind, the SEC requires that the money manager 
affirmatively show that disclosure of the position on a Form 13F filing will 
damage the institution’s “competitive position” by public dispersal of data 
regarding its recent trading patterns.71  Considering applicable insider 
trading law, one might assume that the investment program in question is 
developed using publicly available information assembled by the 
investment manager, though the program itself cannot be public 
information and still meet the eligibility requirements for confidential 
treatment.72   
While indications like this one help market participants understand 
what is not subsumed under the confidential treatment rule, the SEC has 
not provided a definition of what constitutes demonstrable harm to 
“competitive position” from disclosure.73  One might deduce, then, that the 
                                                                                                                          
70 Consider, for example, Warren Buffett, Carl Icahn, John Paulson, and George Soros.  The 
Internet is replete with websites that use regulatory filings (including Forms 13F) to aggregate and 
report upon the investment movements of stock market heavyweights, track their performance, and 
report on their findings to the public, sometimes for a fee.  E.g., GURUFOCUS, 
http://www.gurufocus.com/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2013); STOCKPICKR, 
http://www.stockpickr.com/list/latestpro/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2013). 
71 1998 Guidance Letter, supra note 8, at *4. 
72 Id. 
73 It is worthwhile to note that Congress has not emphasized competition as a core consideration 
of the Securities Acts, but rather as a peripheral concern:  
[T]he Commission’s responsibility [is] to balance the perceived anti-competitive 
effects of the regulatory policy or decision at issue against the purposes of the 
Exchange Act that would be advanced thereby and the costs of doing so.  
Competition would not thereby become paramount to the great purposes of the 
Exchange Act, but the need for and effectiveness of regulatory actions in achieving 
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standard is an open-ended one for fund managers.  The SEC has offered 
that it is within its discretion to provide an exemption if the applicant can 
successfully show that revealing its positions would amount to a 
discernible competitive harm.74  The “demonstrable harm” standard is 
inadequate for the administration of CT Requests because it fails to 
consider the exemption as a counterpart of the reporting regulation from 
which it provides relief.  While section 13(f)’s disclosure requirements 
were enacted in order to advance full disclosure and freely available 
information (because market efficiency is a derivative product of 
maximizing information flow), the exemption is a counterbalance that 
works to preserve incentives to competition for institutional investors.   
Certainly, President Ford emphasized the value of promoting 
competition in the markets upon signing section 13(f) into law, stating that 
the 1975 amendments to the Securities Acts provided “new directives to 
the industry and its regulators to insure that competition is always a prime 
consideration in establishing or abolishing market rules.”75  He 
simultaneously pointed out, though, that the market must function with the 
highest degrees of financial capability, ethical behavior, efficiency, order, 
and accessibility.76  For several of these enumerated goals, enhancing 
competitiveness is a means to the end.  For others—namely ethical 
fortitude and accessibility—regulation must act to ensure that unbridled 
competition does not trample them underfoot.  
In considering the confidential treatment exemption as a balancing 
device that prevents the forced inequitable disclosure of Form 13F 
information by investment managers, application of the exemption should 
be based on a determination of whether compliance with the reporting 
requirements would be the proximate cause of losses in extraordinary 
situations.  In other words, we would be best served to think of it as a 
shield and not a sword: Confidential treatment should be granted in 
scenarios where it is necessary to protect an institutional investor’s 
portfolio from regulation-imposed losses.   
As discussed above, the quintessential case occurs when news of the 
investor’s exit from a position might cause others in the market to sell their 
shares in that stock quickly and preemptively, causing a price drop and 
leaving the discloser with losses she would have otherwise been unlikely to 
incur.77  It might also be used if disclosure makes the cost of an intended 
                                                                                                                          
those purposes would have to be weighed against any detrimental impact on 
competition. 
S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 13–14 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 192.  
74 1998 Guidance Letter, supra note 8, at *4.  
75 Ford, supra note 44. 
76 Id. 
77 See supra note 10 (detailing a possible situation in which this might occur). 
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merger or acquisition prohibitively high because of the size of the resulting 
net loss to the economy generally, which might benefit from the greater 
efficiencies achieved through industry consolidation and achieving 
economies of scale.  It is not to be used, however, as a tool to maximize 
investment managers’ profits at the expense of market transparency.  This 
construction defies the law’s twofold purpose of simultaneously advancing 
informational equity and fair competition. 
III.  LACK OF A MEANINGFUL CONFIDENTIAL TREATMENT STANDARD 
RESULTS IN PRACTICAL DEFICIENCIES IN THE APPLICATION AND 
ADMINISTRATION OF SECTION 13(F) 
Section 13(f) reporting exemption protocol has recently been the 
subject of much scrutiny from the SEC’s independent internal auditor and 
market observers alike.78  The areas that have attracted the most criticism, 
by and large, could be remedied if the SEC adjusted its administration of 
the reporting requirements and the CT Request process to agree with 
Congressional intent, and embraced the balancing act between public 
transparency and protection from private harm.   
In 2010, the SEC’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) released a 
review of the 13(f) reporting requirements and audit findings as to the 
oversight of the 13(f) filing process.79  The report contained twelve 
recommendations to the agency to strengthen its supervision of the 
statutory requirement and demanded written corrective action plans for 
each of the items.80  The OIG reviewed the 13(f) oversight process in light 
of the statute’s intent to “improve the body of publicly available factual 
data” regarding the activity of institutional investment managers and 
“thereby increase investor confidence in the integrity of the U.S. securities 
markets.”81  Moreover, the OIG sought to examine whether then-current 
policies and procedures complied with statutory requirements, including 
whether the review and processing of confidential treatment requests were 
adequate and appropriate.82   
The review found significant shortcomings in the administration and 
supervision of 13(f) filings.  First, the OIG found that the SEC conducted 
                                                                                                                          
78 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REP. NO. 480, REVIEW OF THE SEC’S 
SECTION 13(F) REPORTING REQUIREMENTS (2010) [hereinafter OIG REPORT]; see also Heidi N. Moore, 
Warren Buffett: Even Oracles Have Their Secrets, and the SEC Lets Them, AM. PUB. MEDIA: 
MARKETPLACE (Nov. 8, 2011), http://www.marketplace.org/topics/business/easy-street/warren-buffett-
even-oracles-have-their-secrets-and-sec-lets-them; Andrew Ross Sorkin, One Secret Buffett Gets to 
Keep, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Nov. 14, 2011, 9:24 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/11/14/one-secret-buffett-gets-to-keep/. 
79 OIG REPORT, supra note 78. 
80 Id. at ii. 
81 Id. at iv.  
82 Id. at v. 
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no continuous or systematic review or analysis of Form 13F reports or the 
data found therein.83  In fact, “no Commission division or office had been 
delegated the authority to review the Form 13F filings” and, as a result, no 
office considered such a review part of its ongoing responsibility.84  Not 
surprisingly, this lack of monitoring rendered the data “less useful and 
reliable than Congress had intended.”85  The SEC’s monitoring procedure 
for the filings was so inadequate that there have been at least twenty-two 
documented cases of third party observers from the public informing the 
agency about basic noncompliance by required reporters.86  For example, 
the agency had been notified that certain filers had used the wrong form 
and that other required reporters had failed to submit Forms 13F 
altogether.87   
This administrative failing is notable in part because Form 13F has 
been highlighted as a useful, but underutilized, tool for detecting fraudulent 
activity by institutional investment managers.  For example, in the wake of 
Bernard Madoff’s massive Ponzi scheme, through which he defrauded his 
investors of approximately $18 billion,88 observers have pointed out that 
the Madoff firm’s “slim 13F filing [was] a major red flag.”89  While its 
September 30, 2008 Form 13F showed an equity portfolio valued at 
approximately $237 million, Madoff’s firm had reported total holdings of 
about $17 billion in other filings to the SEC a year earlier.90  The forms 
should have also raised concerns in that the reported holdings were 
inconsistent with the strategies allegedly employed by the company.91   
While Madoff’s failure to comply truthfully with Form 13F filing 
requirements is an inherent hazard embedded in any self-reporting 
regulatory regime, closer inspection of filings that are supposed to be part 
of a useful centralized and standardized repository of information may well 
have played a meaningful role in uncovering the long-perpetrated fraud 
sooner, saving the victims millions of dollars in losses.  The system of 
Form 13F administration, which has been deferential to investment 
companies at best and asleep at the wheel at worst, fails to affect the 
balance between competition and transparency that the regulation is 
designed to achieve.  
                                                                                                                          
83 Id. at 6. 
84 Id. at 8. 
85 Id. at 9. 
86 Id. at 11–12. 
87 Id. 
88 The Madoff Scam: Meet the Liquidator, CBS NEWS: 60 MINUTES (June 20, 2010), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/09/24/60minutes/main5339719.shtml. 
89 ALT. INV. GRP., MADOFF SCANDAL: CASE, RED FLAGS, AND LESSONS LEARNED 5 (2009), 
available at http://altinv.com/news/view/8. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
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Related to this observation is the OIG’s finding that Form 13F does not 
currently require “disclosure of all significant investment activities of 
institutional investment managers.”92  Specifically, the OIG found that the 
universe of reportable security types under section 13(f) had not been 
updated since the enactment of the statute in 1975, nor had the reporting 
threshold been increased to keep pace with inflation and the extraordinary 
growth of the investment management industry.93  As a result, more 
modern and complex investment vehicles such as derivatives, mutual fund 
shares, and hedge positions are not reportable.94   
Because the Dodd-Frank amendments to section 13(f) have not yet 
been implemented through an SEC rule, industry observers have persisted 
in complaining that short positions are not reportable, and that their 
omission misleads not only the public perception of an institutional 
investment manager’s net positions, but also the market’s general 
perceptions about the financial health of companies that offer public 
securities.95  Moreover, the failure to increase the reporting threshold has 
resulted in an enormous uptick in the number of firms required to file and 
significantly increased the burden on the agency without increasing the 
efficacy of the reporting mechanism.96  Neglecting to adjust the reporting 
requirements in order to conform to current stock market realities and 
simultaneously allowing the costs of administering the program to grow 
exponentially appear to contradict the congressional purpose to increase 
market transparency for traders and aggregate useful data for regulators.  
Providing piecemeal information about investment managers’ portfolios, 
                                                                                                                          
92 OIG REPORT, supra note 78, at 25. 
93 Id. at 25–26. 
94 Id.  Ironically, when President Ford signed the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975 into law, 
including section 13(f), he declared that the law was part of vital efforts to continually improve the 
operation of the financial markets and to ensure that antiquated laws and regulations did not “unfairly 
interfere with the need for changes” as markets evolve.  Ford, supra note 44. 
95 See, e.g., Steven M. Davidoff, Disclosure by Short-Sellers Would Improve Market Clarity, N.Y. 
TIMES DEALBOOK (May 22, 2012, 5:39 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/05/22/disclosure-by-
short-sellers-would-improve-market-clarity/ (describing how short position disclosures would have 
helped avoid a precipitous decline in Herbalife Limited’s stock price after David Einhorn of Greenlight 
Capital emerged on one of the company’s earnings conference calls and asked several critical questions 
because it would have prevented other investors from assuming that his line of questioning indicated 
that he was in possession of negative information about the company and had taken a short position 
when he had not); Meena Krishnamsetty, SEC Should Shorten the 13F Reporting Period, Not 13D, 
INSIDER MONKEY BLOG (Mar. 16, 2011, 4:25 PM), http://www.insidermonkey.com/blog/sec-should-
shorten-the-13f-reporting-period-not-13d-2978/ (arguing that the short time periods that investment 
funds require to build large positions offers support for the notion that Form 13F should be required 
more frequently, on a shorter timeline, and include short-sale positions).  But see Michael D. Kurzer, 
Short-Sale Disclosures Would Force Investment Managers to Publicize Secret Sauce, 
INVESTMENT NEWS (Sept. 22, 2013), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20130922/REG/3092299
98 (“If the SEC adopts rules requiring public reporting of individual short-sale positions, an important 
component of fund managers’ trading strategies would be made available to the public at large.”).  
96 OIG REPORT, supra note 78, at 26–27. 
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rather than the complete picture, can also creates hazardous downside risk 
for publicly listed companies.97  This, of course, makes it difficult to expect 
Form 13F to advance sound and efficient security pricing, the end goal of 
both transparency and effective regulation. 
The OIG also reported two serious concerns with specific regard to the 
CT Request process.  First, the auditor found that a majority of the 
confidential treatment requests that were selected for testing lacked 
supporting documentation or a proper audit trail.98  The audit requested 
twenty-five files for review and the agency could not produce any files or 
provide any supporting documentation for twelve of the sample items and, 
for another two items, no file could be located but supporting documents 
were produced.99  When the auditor requested twelve additional files in 
place of those that could not be produced, the agency could only provide 
support for four items.100   
As a result, the OIG concluded that confidential treatment requests in 
many cases appeared to avoid processing, could have been lost or 
misplaced and the confidentiality of the data contained therein 
compromised, and that the Commission had been failing to comply with its 
record retention policies.101  There is anecdotal evidence that the failure to 
substantiate confidential treatment requests is common.  An experienced 
private practitioner in the field of securities regulation admitted that, in 
“years of submitting confidential treatment requests,” he was never 
required to substantiate a single one.102 
Additionally, the OIG found that certain filers for confidential 
treatment received de facto exemption from 13F disclosure even though 
their applications did not meet the criteria for confidential treatment under 
section 13(f).103  Any passage of time between the CT Request filing and 
when the Commission issues a written response to the request results in 
postponed disclosure of investment holdings in accordance with 
section 13(f), essentially giving all or some of the investment manager’s 
reportable securities positions de facto confidential treatment.104  The audit 
found that, at times, cases of de facto exemption exceeded one year.105  It is 
                                                                                                                          
97 Davidoff, supra note 95.  
98 OIG REPORT, supra note 78, at 19. 
99 Id. at 20. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Sorkin, supra note 78.  The comment in Sorkin’s article comes from Christopher J. Hewitt, a 
corporate partner at Tucker Ellis LLP and former partner at Jones Day LLP; his biographical webpage 
asserts expertise in the areas of securities law and SEC compliance, among others.  Christopher J. 
Hewitt, TUCKER ELLIS LLP, http://www.tuckerellis.com/attorneys/christopher-hewitt (last visited Nov. 
20, 2013). 
103 OIG REPORT, supra note 78, at 21. 
104 Id. at 23. 
105 Id. at 24. 
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worth noting that this exceeds the maximum time limit available for 
confidential treatment without refiling.106  Moreover, the OIG found that 
when these long outstanding requests were reviewed, they did not meet the 
substantive criteria laid out by the Commission for confidential treatment, 
and the requests should have been denied.107  Because the Commission 
never responded to the requests, the filers were able to utilize the Form 13F 
CT Requests to inappropriately and indefinitely skirt the regulatory 
requirement. 
Financial media pundits have interpreted the results of this 
investigation as evidence that, while the SEC contends that it grants 
exemptions “for public interest reasons or the protection of investors,” the 
rule is used to routinely exempt rich and powerful investors like Carl 
Icahn, Bill Ackman, and Warren Buffett.108  While official statistics 
detailing confidential treatment request application numbers and approval 
rates are not available, there is evidence that a significant number of such 
large investors are seeking confidential treatment: a SEC spokesperson has 
confirmed that the agency receives about sixty confidential treatment 
requests per quarter.109  These executives and money managers have been 
reported to garner a high rate of success in their applications for 
confidential treatment: one investigator found that Buffett’s Berkshire 
Hathaway receives confidential treatment about half of the time that it 
seeks it.110   
Speaking of publicly traded Berkshire Hathaway, Warren Buffet’s 
conglomerate functions in many ways like a pooled investment fund, while 
at the same time it is subject to the disclosure-centric regime of federal 
securities laws.  The disclosure requirements of the Securities Acts may 
not be appropriately designed for a company that operates a significant 
investment-based profit center outside of its otherwise primary industry but 
does not offer fund interests that are subject to the requirements of the 
Investment Company Act.  It bears observing that the problem with 
reporting exemptions extends beyond Berkshire; the recent past is littered 
with examples of executives at publicly traded corporations operating 
primarily in industries like banking and retail that invested corporate funds 
                                                                                                                          
106 FAQ About Form 13F, supra note 23. 
107 OIG REPORT, supra note 78, at 24. 
108 Sorkin, supra note 78. 
109 Id. 
110 Moore, supra note 78.  Bear in mind that while a fifty percent yield on such requests may 
intuitively seem generous, there is no way for the public to know if this success rate is inappropriately 
high because of the confidential nature of the filings.  Assuming that an in-house legal group or outside 
counsel that has filed many Forms 13F likely knows roughly “where the line is,” it may be reasonable 
to assume that half of the applications optimistically overreach in hopes of lucking out or gaining 
temporary de facto confidential treatment due to administrative shortcomings.  As noted above, there is 
no widely disseminated understanding of where “the line” actually is and what test, if any, the SEC 
employs in evaluating an application’s viability. 
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in risky instruments and employed strategies not disclosed in detail to 
shareholders.111   
Full disclosure of large deployments of capital and key profit-seeking 
strategies is at the heart of cultivating a culture of periodic disclosure 
among public corporations in the United States.  Allowing executives to 
put corporate funds at risk without complying with mandatory disclosure 
rules in a timely manner defies the law’s general emphasis on providing 
accurate and complete information to all market participants 
simultaneously.  It also fosters a market culture that favors the informed 
insider over the ordinary participant.  As pointed out above, Rule 13f-1 and 
Form 13F could prevent companies that operate like investment 
management companies, but outside the scope of the 1940 Act, from 
skirting important disclosures to shareholders about the extent and quality 
of their financial bets just because the annual and quarterly financial 
statements do not require that level of granularity.112 
There are also logistical shortcomings.  Even if a trade occurred a 
single day before the reporting period closed, the forty-five day grace 
period for filing is “an eternity” in the capital markets.113  As argued in the 
prior section, the lag inherent in the section 13(f) reporting procedure 
allows the investor ample time to initiate position-building or liquidating 
measures, and any interpretation of section 13(f) that suggests that the 
investor needs more time to execute profitable strategies is questionable at 
best.114  Section 13(f) already gives the investor at least forty-five days, and 
potentially up to 135 days, to accumulate the position.115  He should not be 
                                                                                                                          
111 See, e.g., Jesse Eisinger, In Scrutiny of JPMorgan Loss, Bigger Questions Left Unanswered, 
N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (May 16, 2012, 12:15 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/05/16/in-
scrutiny-of-jpmorgan-loss-bigger-questions-left-unanswered/ (detailing how JPMorgan Chase suffered 
massive losses with respect to the so-called “London Whale” investments in derivatives contracts not 
disclosed in its regulatory filings); Moore, supra note 78 (commenting on how the now-defunct MF 
Global brokerage firm, under CEO Jon Corzine, took massive risks with its treasury’s funds, took on 
massive amounts of leverage, and ended up bankrupt); Sears Sees Rise in Fourth Quarter Profits 
Despite Trading Losses, CNBC.COM (Jan. 10, 2007), http://www.cnbc.com/id/16562581/Sears_Sees_R
ise_in_Fourth_Quarter_Profits_Despite_Trading_Losses (reporting that Sears Holdings’ CEO and 
former hedge fund manager Edward Lampert’s risky derivative investments for the department store 
chain resulted in losses for shareholders).  Whether companies that take massive bets in risky financial 
instruments should be required to disclose such facts in a detailed manner in their 10-K and 10-Q 
filings is a separate but important question.  If Rule 13f-1 compliance was better enforced and Form 
13F contents were made more comprehensive and valuable, such changes may not be necessary for the 
consolidated financial statement reports.  The Form 13F would become an important supplement to the 
other financial reporting mandated for publicly traded companies. 
112 See supra Part II.A. 
113 Mebane Faber, Bring in the Clones, WEALTHMANAGEMENT.COM (Nov. 1, 2009), 
http://wealthmanagement.com/alternative-investments/bring-clones. 
114 See supra Part II.B. 
115 The 135-day maximum timeframe can be achieved if the investor were to initiate a new buying 
or selling strategy on the first day of the quarter.  The position would not be reported for the length of 
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able to act secretly for as long as a strategy takes to fully implement.  If he 
is not able to establish or liquidate his position before the disclosure 
requirements kick in, the regulation should, as a matter of policy, provide 
the public with an opportunity to benefit from knowing about the move 
before it is completed.  
In addition to all the documented shortfalls in administering 
section 13(f)’s requirements, the statute appears to be somewhat toothless 
from an enforcement perspective.  The agency has only brought one action 
against an investment firm for failing to properly disclose its investment 
positions.116  Public questions about section 13(f) and its shadowy opt-out 
process have been repeatedly mooted.117  This insinuates that the playing 
field, from the all-important informational perspective, appears to remain 
slanted toward a Wall Street inner circle.118  
Sophisticated market regulators and observers should not be surprised 
that some long-unregulated private investment companies are hesitant to 
comply freely with section 13(f) requirements when an avenue to 
exemption exists.119  Hedge funds and other private investment groups, 
concerned that their “proprietary” investment strategies comprise their 
competitive advantage in a flooded market of investment managers, pride 
themselves on being so-called black boxes and work to ensure these 
strategies remain elusive to their competitors and the general public.120  
Section 13(f) is designed to cut against that frame of mind, but the de facto 
exemption from reporting that can often result from merely filling out an 
unsubstantiated Form 13F CT Request and submitting it in a timely fashion 
undermines the effectiveness of the regulation.  This contrasts starkly with 
Congress’s intent to empower the Commission to secure investor trust and 
confidence by shedding light on an industry with a competitive stake in its 
own secrecy. 
                                                                                                                          
the quarter, which I assume to be 90 days, plus the 45-day grace period for compiling quarter-end 
reports.    
116 Quattro Global Capital, LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 56,252, Investment Advisers Act 
Release No. 2634, 2007 WL 2471810 (Aug. 15, 2007).  
117 Sorkin, supra note 78. 
118 Id. 
119 See Edward Pekarek, Note, Hogging the Hedge? Bulldog’s 13F Theory May Not Be So Lucky, 
12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 1079, 1084 (2007) (detailing the legal claim by hedge fund manager 
Phillip Goldstein of Bulldog Investors that Form 13F disclosures are unconstitutional taking of trade 
secrets in violation of the Fifth Amendment). 
120 Moore, supra note 78.  Interestingly, on the issue of property rights, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit held that mere disclosure to the SEC does not raise Fifth 
Amendment takings concerns even assuming that petitioner has a cognizable property interest in 
knowledge of its investment positions.  Full Value Advisors, LLC v. SEC, 633 F.3d 1101, 1110 (D.C. 
Cir. 2011). 
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IV.  ADVANCING MARKET EFFICIENCY BY WAY OF FORM 13F REPORTING 
In response to media attention toward the apparent inequity involved 
with the administration of section 13(f), large investors have countered that 
the confidential treatment exemption is required to maintain their 
competitive advantage and to avoid disincentivizing investment research 
generally.121  I will now turn to theoretical evidence that explains how 
liberally granting CT Requests can inflict more negative effects on the 
market generally than might be incurred by the manager who is forced to 
disclose her positions. 
In contrast to traditionally subjective fairness-oriented approaches to 
policymaking, work by economic researchers supports the notion that 
policy decisions about the public interest in promoting adequate disclosure 
and increasing market efficiencies are less a matter of judgment and more 
often an empirical question.122  This is partly the result of the minimalist 
regulatory approach of the securities regime, in the sense that the law does 
not grant authority to the government to positively assess the substance of 
an investment or its worthiness for purchase or sale, leaving the success of 
the instrument instead to judgment of its merits by the investing public, 
which is ostensibly better informed as a result of the required disclosures.  
Ultimately, the “dominating principle of securities regulation is that 
anyone willing to disclose the right things can sell or buy whatever he 
wants at whatever price the market will sustain.”123 
Nevertheless, as it is often inclined to do for its public policy-oriented 
decisions, the SEC justifies the availability of Form 13F exemption as 
simply for the “protection of investors.”124  This may be attributable in part 
to the lack of a sufficiently articulated statement of goals in the legislative 
history associated with this section of the Securities Acts Amendments of 
1975.  Permitting selective section 13(f) filing exemptions is the equivalent 
of making lower quality financial reporting acceptable under a regulatory 
regime that typically angles to meet its goals by demanding high quality, 
accurate statements of financial condition.  The result is a redaction of 
information that increases information asymmetry among market 
participants.  This Part suggests that equitable accounting policy provides a 
foundational model for illuminating exactly what degree of disclosure is 
actually in the public interest and whether and when exemption from 
                                                                                                                          
121 Sorkin, supra note 78 (reporting on an interview with Warren Buffett, wherein Mr. Buffett 
“said that he did not believe that public investors should always be allowed to piggyback on investment 
ideas made by professional investors, especially before they are finished buying”). 
122 ANNE M. THOMPSON, SEC CONFIDENTIAL TREATMENT ORDERS: BALANCING COMPETING 
REGULATORY OBJECTIVES 9 (2010).  
123 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of 
Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 670 (1984). 
124 FAQ About Form 13F, supra note 23. 
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disclosure requirements is acceptable. 
In order to make an informed policy decision, one must first determine 
the goals of the legislation in question.  It has been widely stated and 
repeatedly reaffirmed that the purpose of the federal securities laws is to 
promote market fairness through disclosure of complete and accurate 
information about securities and the markets on which they are traded.125  
It is important, though, to understand why this policy is in the public 
interest in order to properly apply it.  While the vague platitude “protecting 
investors” seems to have become something of a rallying cry for the SEC, 
it is inadequate as a policy standard.  Achieving general fairness or 
defending purportedly small and defenseless individual investors from 
fraud and exploitation by insiders should not be the perceived hallmark of 
just financial markets.126  Such a concept is too closely aligned with ex post 
notions of distributive justice that call for equality of outcomes, which 
cancels out rewards for risk-taking and ultimately creates disincentives to 
investment instead of ex ante equality of opportunity, which, by contrast, 
incentivizes information discovery and investment.127  In this sense, large 
investors arguing in favor of broad availability of the exemption are right.  
The exercise of implementing the exemption should be informed, however, 
by a narrower understanding of “opportunity” than many large investors 
might insist upon. 
As discussed, the legislative history and regulatory releases for 
section 13(f) also mention the counterbalancing interest in not requiring 
“harmful” disclosure of information.128  But the existence of information 
asymmetry is the major reason for systematic ex ante risk-adjusted return 
differentials across investors; such asymmetries are expected to benefit 
large-scale investors who have increased access to information 
characterized by increasing returns to scale.129  Proponents of allowing 
disclosure exemptions for competitive reasons—often the large institutions 
that benefit most from information asymmetry—argue that policies which 
deprive them of their informational advantages are anti-competitive 
because they disincentivize them from working for superior investment 
strategies in the first place.130 
Economic theory and empirical evidence support the idea, however, 
that inequity in capital markets due to information asymmetry results in 
                                                                                                                          
125 JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 1 (6th ed. 2009). 
126 Baruch Lev, Toward a Theory of Equitable and Efficient Accounting Policy, 63 ACCT. REV. 1, 
6 (1988). 
127 Id. at 4.  
128 1998 Guidance Letter, supra note 8, at *2. 
129 Lev, supra note 126, at 4–6. 
130 1998 Guidance Letter, supra note 8, at *2; see also Sorkin, supra note 78 (quoting Warren 
Buffett that allowing the public to free-ride on the investment ideas of “professional investors” is 
“unfair”).   
 2013] PROVIDING EQUAL INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITY 789 
negative social consequences, including higher transaction costs, thinner 
markets, lower liquidity, and, in general, decreased gains from trade.131  
Underpinning this theory is the idea that free market participants, no matter 
how small, are not “defenseless” or inherently exploitable by large-scale 
managers and insiders because they have a number of options available to 
them, including adoption of a broadly diversified and passive portfolio 
strategy, recourse to legal and contractual methods of preventing insiders 
from transacting in the securities of their own firms altogether, and 
withdrawal from the market.132  Thus, while effective, these self-defense 
tactics each introduce inefficiencies and costs into the market, borne by all 
participants.  Disclosure was designed, at the outset at least, to mitigate 
these adverse effects and, in turn, to promote public welfare.133  
This does not necessarily imply that securities regulators should adopt 
a policy requiring that all relevant information be publicly disclosed.  
Rather, information disclosure rules should be limited to ensure that the 
transfer of information from the informed to the uninformed via regulatory 
disclosures will be efficient—that is, the decrease in information 
asymmetry by way of the transfer should result in an expanded investor 
base and increased liquidity which, in turn, will lead to a broad increase in 
opportunities for trade and risk-sharing, spurring diffuse increases to 
welfare for most investors while minimizing the negative effects on the 
reporting investors.134  On the other hand, it is not unimaginable that 
aggressive disclosure rules might result in pure welfare redistribution, in 
which some investors benefit materially at the expense of others.  Such 
information redistribution is permissible in only the most dire of 
circumstances: if and only if a refusal to impose information disclosure 
requirements would compromise market function entirely such that the 
aggregated general harm to all exceeds the isolated harm to the 
disclosers.135  Thus, when the Commission is implementing the 
congressional mandate to allow disclosure exemption in cases that might 
result in “harmful” effects, just how the agency perceives and measures 
such harm is of central importance. 
                                                                                                                          
131 Lev, supra note 126, at 9. 
132 Id. at 6–7. 
133 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 123, at 670.  Easterbrook and Fischel note that relying 
exclusively on this description of federal securities regulation is too simple in the modern age and that 
the regime persists now because it also—or perhaps instead—has found support from interest groups 
representing securities issuers who utilize it to protect their own interests at the expense of investors.  
Id. at 670–71.  
134 Lev, supra note 126, at 10.  The idea is analogous to the Pareto efficiency principle.  An 
allocation of goods, either input or output goods, is Pareto efficient if one cannot find a reallocation of 
those goods such that one can produce more of something (utility or output) without producing less of 
something else.  Bruce C. Greenwald & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Externalities in Economies with Imperfect 
Information and Incomplete Markets, 101 Q.J. ECON. 229, 230, 234 (1986). 
135 Lev, supra note 126, at 10. 
 790 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:763 
Professor Baruch Lev of New York University Stern School of 
Business has pointed out that recognizing “evenhandedness” in 
implementation of perfectly efficient information redistribution “is 
obviously impossible to achieve in most situations.”136  With that reality in 
mind, he argues that the ex ante equity objective seems to provide a 
standard that specifies the public interest: “The interests of the less 
informed investors should, in general, be favored over those of the more 
informed investors.”137  Employing Lev’s rule here shows us that the 
balancing paradigm, qualified with a bias toward the less informed (and 
therefore in favor of disclosure) and a higher bar in terms of substantiating 
“harm,” can provide the SEC with clearer, more operational “public 
interest” guideposts than currently exist under the “protecting investors” 
and “preserving competition” rhetoric often invoked in discussions of 
section 13(f).  Use of this standard will, in general, continue to demand a 
fact-driven analysis of the broad consequences of disclosure exemption 
and resulting information asymmetries.   
More importantly though, the standard shifts the SEC’s evaluation of 
an application in such a way that the agency must think more critically 
about the harm incurred by the information-sharer in relation to the gains 
enjoyed by the information gainers.  Arguments that information sharing 
undercuts competition are categorically untrue under this rubric, and 
should not result in successful application for exemption.  Claims that 
disclosure results in loss of opportunity would similarly be insufficient to 
meet statutory or common law understandings of harm.138  The applicant 
should instead be demonstrating real and tangible harm as a result of 
disclosure—making the case that the firm’s situation is one in which 
information disclosure is tantamount to devaluing the institution’s 
investment book and, as a result, passing those losses on to the investors in 
their funds or accounts or, in the alternative, to their shareholders.  Because 
the exemption’s plain and narrow meaning allows for an end-around in 
situations where disclosure would harm investors, this is a plausible and 
commonsense application.  Allowing it to exist for the purpose of 
maximizing gain for the institutions who might stand to reap the most 
upside from being out in front of their own transactions—or, 
correspondingly, for one pool of fortunate investors over all of the others—
                                                                                                                          
136 Id. at 13. 
137 Id.  
138 See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (2012) (setting the amount recoverable for securities fraud as the actual 
losses, calculated as the value at the time of purchase less the value at the time of the suit or the value at 
which the shareholder disposed of the stock, either before or after the initiation of suit, except for any 
amount of the loss for which the issuer can prove was caused by something other than the 
misstatement); Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 343–44 (2005) (finding that private 
securities fraud actions are similar to common law deceit and misrepresentation tort actions and worthy 
of the same standard for determining the extent of damages). 
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strikes a dissonant chord against the theme of fair and efficient markets.  
V.  SECTION 13(F) AND AN INTEGRATED SECURITIES LAW DOCTRINE  
Functionally, federal securities regulations generally demand 
disclosure as a means of maintaining fair dealing in the marketplace, 
facilitating capital formation, and protecting against fraud.139  The 
theoretical basis for this is rooted in the fact that investment securities are 
not like cars or homes: the prospective buyer cannot effectively self-
inspect the asset or hire a trained eye somewhat cheaply to tell him if 
something is wrong with it before he plunks down a large sum of money.  
It is nearly impossible for the average investor to reliably and 
independently arrange for an inspection of the condition of a company.  
Requisite accounting and analytical proficiency aside, the resources 
consumed in such an exercise alone would easily make the upfront costs so 
high that the investment would become nonsensical for all but the 
wealthiest investors.   
In designing the law, Congress made the decision to place much of this 
cost on the issuer, who is generally more willing and able to bear it as a 
cost of accessing capital markets.  As part of this effort, section 13 of the 
Exchange Act provided “mechanisms for mandatory disclosure 
requirements” for the benefit of publicly traded markets.140  This effort was 
not solely driven by the choice to make large amounts of high quality 
information available to investors for their benefit and protection, but also 
“by the belief that enhanced disclosures . . . would allow sound investing to 
triumph over manipulation and speculation.”141   
In angling to make manipulation less feasible and speculation less 
prevalent, the resulting regime of mandatory disclosure reduces fraud, 
which allows for allocative efficiency and maximizes the net benefit to 
society.142  A host of important regulations do this work.  One might 
reasonably suggest that the annual and quarterly financial reporting 
requirements of public companies under the Exchange Act,143 the internal 
controls and independent audit standards mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act,144 and the sweeping fraud protections imposed by section 11 of the 
Securities Act145 and section 10(b) of the Exchange Act146 all do enough to 
                                                                                                                          
139 The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and 
Facilitates Capital Formation, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (June 10, 2013), 
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml. 
140 COX ET AL., supra note 125, at 548. 
141 Id. 
142 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 123, at 673. 
143 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78o(d). 
144 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 103, 404, 116 Stat. 745, 755–57, 789.  
145 15 U.S.C. § 77k. 
146 Id. § 78j. 
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provide market transparency and efficiency, and that section 13(f) 
provisions have not received attention because their work is repetitive of 
these other filings and therefore unnecessary.  Put differently, one might 
ask what unique protection the section 13(f) reporting requirements 
provide.   
The answer is that the statute does not do something altogether 
different than the other regulatory requirements.  Section 13(f) is supposed 
to prevent manipulation and control speculation, as well as inhibit fraud 
and unjust enrichment by investment managers, while the other disclosure 
requirements are intended to prevent manipulation and fraud by security 
issuers.  We can use the doctrine that has developed in the more robust 
area of security issuance and periodic filing enforcement to define the 
contours of section 13(f) requirements for institutional managers and how 
they should be enforced.   
A.  Preventing Market Manipulation 
It is well documented that Congress was motivated to protect investors 
against manipulation of securities markets when it enacted the Exchange 
Act: “There cannot be honest markets without honest publicity.  
Manipulation and dishonest practices of the market place thrive upon 
mystery and secrecy.”147  The SEC has suggested that market manipulation 
is epitomized by boiler room-style “pump-and-dump” schemes, which 
entail hard-sell tactics in connection with the sale of a company’s stock 
“through false and misleading statements to the marketplace.”148  “Often 
the promoters will claim to have ‘inside’ information about an impending 
development” or some foolproof alchemy that will allow them to convert 
market data into accurate predictors of future market prices.149   
In reality, these promoters have often purchased penny shares on the 
market before initiating their selling efforts, and they stand to gain by 
selling these shares after they have created a frothy, false market in the 
security, causing the subsequent investors to suffer losses.150  Market 
manipulation is not confined to pump-and-dump schemes.  It extends 
equally to all practices “intended to mislead investors by artificially 
affecting market activity” including “wash sales, matched orders, [and] 
rigged price[s].”151  In sum, “[i]t connotes intentional or willful conduct 
designed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or artificially 
                                                                                                                          
147 H.R. REP. NO. 1383, at 11 (1934). 
148 “Pump-and-Dumps” and Market Manipulations, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Mar. 
12, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/answers/pumpdump.htm.  
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
151 Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977). 
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affecting the price of securities.”152  The Supreme Court has declared that 
there is “[n]o doubt [that] Congress meant to prohibit the full range of 
ingenious devices that might be used to manipulate securities prices.”153 
Defining “artificial effects” on the market as those that have no basis 
in the economic substance of the security in question, one could make the 
case that permitting exemption from section 13(f) and therefore allowing 
selective disclosure of securities positions is meant to control current 
market prices for a stock by minimizing copycat investing and preventing 
artificially suppressed or bolstered valuations.  The fact that certain 
investors are buying or selling a stock is not usually, in itself, material to 
the stock’s intrinsic worth.154  Large investors claim that disclosure 
artificially adjusts market pricing in this way as a basis for arguing that the 
exemption from section 13(f) should be available to them.155   
It seems more likely that exemptions allow institutional investors to 
artificially keep the information they have gained from being incorporated 
into the market price.  In reality, all of the investment decisions made by 
these institutions should be of equal value in an efficient market.  By 
arguing that certain buy-and-sell decisions are more worthy of confidential 
treatment, the managers are usually admitting that those investments are in 
securities that present an informational arbitrage opportunity.  It is not that 
the market follows them blindly, as many suggest.  In reality, the market 
could see that a prominent investor has taken a position in that security and 
deduce that he knows something that has not been broadly disseminated.  
Given section 13(f) disclosure requirements, hiding a position from the 
marketplace is a form of price manipulation. 
Not only does selective disclosure prevent natural market forces from 
maintaining efficient pricing mechanisms, whether rationally related to the 
valuation of the issuer or not, but it raises valid concerns about equitable 
treatment.  By making special exceptions available for large investors in 
certain circumstances, the securities regulation regime risks playing 
favorites and disadvantaging everyone else in the process.  As one large 
institutional investor said in criticizing confidential treatment, “If I’m 
going to pull down my pants in public I want everyone to pull down their 
                                                                                                                          
152 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976). 
153 Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 477. 
154 See IVO WELCH, CORPORATE FINANCE 4, 28 (2d ed. 2011) (explaining that a security is a 
financial claim against a company that is generally sold to investors and the value of such investment is 
determined principally by calculating the net present value of the future cash flows to which that 
investment entitles its owner).  Some informed investors make a living from exploiting what they 
perceive as “noise” trading.  This phenomenon consists of market participants who trade for 
idiosyncratic reasons—that is, reasons unrelated to the present value of the security’s cash flows.  Id. at 
291. 
155 Sorkin, supra note 78 (“[B]illionaire investors . . . essentially argue that the simple disclosure 
of an investment would cause the price to rise so much as to scuttle their strategy.”).   
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pants, too.”156  This colorfully illustrates the point that Form 13F 
confidential treatment exemptions should be approached with a skeptical 
eye.  Once the choice is made to operate a public securities market in an 
open and transparent manner, it becomes difficult to equitably implement 
selective provisions for confidentiality.  
B.  Deterring Speculation:  Protection for Fund Investors 
Speculation happens when investors chase excess investment returns 
by buying up high-risk, high-return assets that do not have the fundamental 
economic substance needed to support their market price and are more 
likely to suffer deep losses.157  While not inherently a problem, speculation 
tends to compromise investor interests and markets generally when 
accompanied by large amounts of borrowing and regulatory schemes that 
favor Wall Street firms and their ilk at the expense of individual 
investors.158  It also increases the likelihood of bubbles, which can result in 
traumatic financial market crashes and rippling macroeconomic effects.159   
Within the context of investment management companies and the 
funds under their purview, opacity encourages speculation.  The market for 
pooled investment products is saturated—there are over fourteen thousand 
publicly available investment funds representing over $13 trillion in 
assets.160  Over forty-five percent of U.S. households own such funds.161  
Assuming most investors are rational, they would prefer to invest in 
securities and funds that offer more reward, that is, where they expect high 
rates of return.162  Of course, the only empirical evidence at one’s disposal 
for seeking high rates of return is the record of historical returns garnered 
by a particular fund or manager.   
It is difficult, however, to glean from this information whether the 
success is a result of skill, superior access to information, or just dumb 
luck.163  As a result, average fund investors are more likely to place their 
money into funds that have done well on the assumption that those funds 
are more likely to continue to outperform.  Funds that underperform, on the 
                                                                                                                          
156 Id. (quoting Larry N. Feinberg, founder of Oracle Partners). 
157 Jesse Eisinger, Efforts to Revive the Economy Lead to Worries of a Bubble, N.Y. TIMES 
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other hand, tend to disappear quietly.164  This phenomenon, called 
survivorship bias, means that investment fund opportunities available at 
any given time typically look like they have been able to consistently earn 
excess returns,165 when efficient market theory says that they cannot unless 
they consistently take on outsized risk.166 
This all creates incentives for investment managers to shoot for the 
moon and, correspondingly, take on too much risk.  The countervailing 
check against this competitive impulse is transparency.  If a rational 
investor sees that a given fund has strongly outperformed the market and 
then can see that it is because the manager has leveraged the fund—by 
buying or selling securities with borrowed money or investing in 
companies with unsustainably high debt ratios—he might decide that the 
investment is a poor one in the context of his overall portfolio.  Section 
13(f) disclosure requirements prevent investment managers from hiding 
risk on their holdings reports for the benefit of investors in the same way 
that quarterly and annual disclosure requirements allow stock investors to 
understand the particulars of risk and reward that face a corporate entity.167  
To allow exception in the context of one and not the other is a 
contradiction that is hard to justify.   
C.  Fraud-on-the-Market   
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act168 and Rule 10b-5169 are the 
                                                                                                                          
164 Id. at 306. 
165 Id. at 306–07. 
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Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of 
investors.”  Id.   
169 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012).  Rule 10b-5, promulgated under the authority of section 10(b) 
of the Exchange Act, states:  
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any 
national securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to 
defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any 
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principal tools for promoting the informational integrity of securities 
transactions.170  Despite their sweeping language and legislative rhetoric, 
the law and its implementing rule have long been interpreted mainly as 
antifraud provisions.171  To state a cause of action under Rule 10b-5, “a 
plaintiff must plead that in connection with the purchase or sale of 
securities, the defendant, acting with scienter, made a false material 
representation or omitted to disclose material information, and that 
plaintiff’s reliance on defendant’s action caused [plaintiff] injury.”172  
According to Rule 405 of the Securities Act, “material, when used to 
qualify a requirement for the furnishing of information as to any subject, 
limits the information required to those matters to which there is a 
substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would attach importance in 
determining whether to purchase the security registered.”173  The Supreme 
Court has interpreted the materiality threshold to contemplate a showing of 
“substantial likelihood that, under all the circumstances,” the 
misrepresentation would be of “actual significance in the deliberations of a 
reasonable shareholder.”174  Or, in other words, there must be a substantial 
likelihood that revelation of the truth “would have been viewed by the 
reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of 
information made available.”175 
The fraud-by-overt-deception-only view of Rule 10b-5 gave way with 
the watershed decision in Basic Inc. v. Levinson,176 which acknowledged 
that plaintiffs are able to take advantage of the “fraud-on-the-market” 
presumption of reliance.177  This theory is premised on the idea that, in 
open and liquid markets, the value of a given security is determined by the 
totality of available information regarding the security’s issuer and its 
business.178  Misrepresentations, therefore, defraud those transacting in the 
security even if the market participants do not rely directly upon the 
                                                                                                                          
act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or 
deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.   
Id. 
170 COX ET AL., supra note 125, at 659. 
171 See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 666 n.27 (1983) (“[T]o constitute a violation of Rule 
10b-5, there must be fraud.”); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234−35 (1980) (“Section 10(b) 
is aptly described as a catchall provision, but what it catches must be fraud.”). 
172 Time-Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 264 (2d Cir. 1993) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Bloor v. Carro, Spanbock, Londin, Rodman & Fass, 754 F.2d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1985)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted), superseded by statute on other grounds, Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 
1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737. 
173 17 C.F.R. § 230.405. 
174 TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). 
175 Id. 
176 485 U.S. 224 (1988).  
177 Id. at 247.  
178 Id. at 241. 
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misstatements or omissions.179  This creates what is now a well-established 
“theoretical link” between Rule 10b-5 doctrine and the efficient markets 
theory: a cardinal goal of the federal securities fraud proscription is to 
prevent distortions in the market.180   
While it may be improbable that courts would interpret lax 
section 13(f) standards or systematic abuses as violations of Rule 10b-5 
itself, these problems raise the same kind of fraud-on-the-market issues as 
those in Rule 10b-5 jurisprudence.  The analogy is helpful in informing 
even application of the statute by the SEC and the courts.  The presumption 
that all relevant information in the market is incorporated into the stock 
price and that a market price not reflecting all information inherently 
misleads investors is directly applicable in the context of institutional 
investment managers acquiring or dispensing of a security.  Often, the 
presence of large institutional investors in the stock of a corporation acts as 
an implicit backing of management, sometimes even in cases where the 
corporation’s fundamental financial indicators and short-term business 
prospects are negative or limited.  Whether a corporation can accumulate 
that type of financial support in the market is material information in 
evaluating its stability; because of their subordinated position in the capital 
structure, institutional investors with large equity stakes are more likely to 
ensure that the companies they invest in maintain or improve their 
management and avoid risks associated with excessive debt and financial 
distress.   
Concealing the presence (or disappearance) of such an investor may 
artificially support or suppress a stock price.  This is glaringly obvious in 
the context of exiting institutional support for a publicly traded stock.  If 
top-holder institutional investors do not have to disclose that they have 
disposed of the stock until they have fully closed the position, the effects of 
the changed risk profile and weakened corporate financial health are borne 
entirely by remaining shareholders.  Dominant investors can use the Form 
13F exemption provision in this way to shift risk.  Section 13(f) provisions 
allow for the investment manager to begin liquidating the position silently, 
but if she cannot complete the sales in a timely manner and the liquidation 
is material to the value of the underlying stock, she will be forced to share 
in at least part of any resulting losses. 
D. The Unjust Enrichment Principle:  An Avenue to Civil Liability for 
Section 13(f) Malfeasance 
Professor James J. Park argues that the subsequent application of Rule 
                                                                                                                          
179 Id. at 241−42. 
180 James J. Park, Rule 10b-5 and the Rise of the Unjust Enrichment Principle, 60 DUKE L.J. 345, 
356 (2010). 
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10b-5 to insider trading matters reflects a jurisprudence that has become 
concerned with the prevention of unjust enrichment over a strict adherence 
to the limits of traditional fraud doctrine.181  By way of illustration, Park 
points to the case of United States v. O’Hagan,182 involving a law partner 
who worked on a potential tender offer for a client who was the acquirer in 
the deal.183  O’Hagan, the lawyer, had no role in the negotiations with the 
target company but became aware of the deal and purchased call options 
and stock in the target company.184  When the deal became public 
knowledge, O’Hagan profited substantially from the resulting rise in the 
stock price.185  In addressing whether O’Hagan’s misappropriation of the 
inside information violated Rule 10b-5, the Supreme Court upheld his 
conviction, holding that his liability is premised on the “fiduciary-turned-
trader’s deception of those who entrusted him with access to confidential 
information.”186   
In contrast to the classic theories of insider trading liability, which are 
premised on a violation of Rule 10b-5 via breach of fiduciary 
relationship,187 the O’Hagan misappropriation theory rests on either—or 
both—an agency theory and a property rights theory.188  The agency theory 
is based on the Court’s finding of liability in breaching the relationship of 
trust between O’Hagan and his law firm, which was a non-party to the 
transaction.189  In establishing the property rights theory, the Court 
observed that the “company’s confidential information . . . qualifies as 
property to which the company has a right of exclusive use.”190  In 
acknowledging that this theoretical leap by the Court appears to prohibit a 
broader range of conduct than classical theories of securities fraud, Park 
concludes that the guiding rationale for prosecuting insider trading under 
Rule 10b-5 constitutes an expansion from the antifraud theory into the 
prevention of unjust enrichment by market participants.191   
Park argues that there are three simple elements to the unjust 
enrichment principle: it “applies to (1) deceptive conduct, (2) coinciding 
with a securities transaction (3) that enriches some individual at the 
                                                                                                                          
181 Id. at 369. 
182 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
183 Id. at 647.   
184 Id. at 647–48. 
185 Id. at 648. 
186 Id. at 652. 
187 See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) (holding that liability for insider 
trading violations under section 10(b) is premised upon a duty to disclose arising from a fiduciary 
relationship between parties to the transaction). 
188 Park, supra note 180, at 370–73. 
189 O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652. 
190 Id. at 654. 
191 Park, supra note 180, at 374. 
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expense of others.”192  He displays how unjust enrichment functions as an 
expansive principle within the regulation of the securities market: it has 
effectively been used in enforcement actions relating to matters of 
qualitative materiality, broker-dealer misappropriation, mutual-fund 
market timing, and stock option backdating.193  Similarly, the principle 
might be applied to the section 13(f) exemption in that the regulation can 
be used as a procedural loophole to protect investment strategies before 
they have been fully deployed.  Selective disclosure via the use of the 
exception is in fact deceptive (although currently sanctioned) protection of 
securities transaction information.   
The problem with the exemption, though, is that if it is misused, it has 
the capacity to enrich more informed investors at the expense of the less 
informed.  A disclosure-based system of market oversight should be 
suspicious of a regulatory device that functions this way.  If the regulation 
fails in this manner, though, the shortcomings are a product of 
administrative application, not the law itself.  Legal biases toward those 
already in more advantageous positions are bad for markets because they 
discourage participation by everyone else, or otherwise encourage an “if 
you can’t beat ‘em, join ‘em” mentality that makes the only rational choice 
for investors to invest their money with institutional managers with the 
informational advantages, resulting in more management fees for those 
chosen institutions.  The result is an indirect sort of government-sponsored 
oligopoly in the financial management market.  Ultimately, the unjust 
enrichment theory, side-by-side with the fraud-on-the-market presumption, 
suggests that improper use of Form 13F exemptions for anything except 
the prevention of imminent losses should be actionable.  Rule 10b-5 
doctrine provides a blueprint for policing such improprieties and, at its 
outer bounds, may provide for a viable avenue through which to enforce 
noncompliance or abuse of section 13(f).   
If section 13(f) is going to be a meaningful part of the canon of 
securities regulation, it should be coherent with the overriding mission and 
policy of the doctrine.  By framing the application of the law within the 
four corners of market manipulation prevention, speculation deterrence, 
uniform enforcement against fraud-on-the-market, and prohibitions on 
unjust enrichment, it becomes easier to identify the regulation’s potential 
as a safeguard of fair dealing and obstruction for deceptive practices.  
Applying these concurrent considerations to section 13(f)’s administration 
and enforcement, it becomes apparent that its current state of 
administration falls short and is in need of an overhaul.  
                                                                                                                          
192 Id. at 377. 
193 Id. at 377–85. 
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VI.  THE WAY TO MORE RATIONAL AND HELPFUL 
FORM 13F DISCLOSURES 
The central argument of this Note is that the SEC and federal courts 
should structure the implementation and enforcement of investment 
company disclosure rules, particularly those made in fulfillment of 
statutory responsibilities under section 13(f) of the Exchange Act, in a way 
that balances the competitive interest of investment managers in their 
strategic decisions with the public interest in transparent and efficient 
markets.  Having explained a compelling reason for adopting such a 
policy, as well as a doctrinal foundation upon which it can rest, I will now 
suggest improvements to the practical administration of the section 13(f) 
requirements and exemption that will align enforcement of this law with 
the interests outlined above. 
A.  Update Rule 13f-1 to Provide Comprehensive Reports 
It was emphasized at the time the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975 
were passed that part of their purpose was to allow regulation to keep pace 
with growth and development in the financial industry.194  Nearly forty 
years later, the rules dictating the management of this disclosure provision 
have not been substantially reviewed and are now woefully out of date.  
Considering the dramatic rise of private investment vehicles, including 
hedge funds, “long/short strategies” generally, and the increased 
complexity of widely available financial instruments, Dodd-Frank 
section 929X, which mandates the inclusion of all short positions on a 
monthly basis,195 is a step in the right direction.  The rules should also be 
amended to mandate disclosure of all the most common exchange-traded 
financial instruments.  This should include options contracts and a 
calculation of investment leverage for the investment company and its 
products individually, where applicable.  Details of this sort and specificity 
are what made the original section 13(f) disclosures valuable in light of 
market realities of that time.  In addition, the minimum reporting threshold 
should be raised from $100 million in assets under management to a 
substantially higher level.  This would reduce the number of reporting 
entities required and allow the SEC to focus on the firms that are more able 
to make a discernible impact on securities markets due to the size of their 
holdings. The new threshold should consider the leverage ratio so that it 
might still catch small, but highly leveraged funds that have a real potential 
to affect the market in public securities.  
                                                                                                                          
194 See Ford, supra note 44 (“[W]e must be sure that laws and regulations written 30 or 40 years 
ago do not unfairly interfere with the need for changes in our modern-day markets.”). 
195 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929X, 
124 Stat. 1376, 1870–71 (2010).  
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In contemporary markets, with long-oriented stock investing 
constituting only a small piece of the overall investment management 
world and widely contained within the mutual fund and exchange traded 
fund industries, which are regulated by the Investment Company Act of 
1940,196 Form 13F contents are too incomplete to be of value.  It makes 
little sense to enforce costly compliance with a regulation that provides 
such limited beneficial effects for the market as compared with its original 
design.  Rather than publishing a list of reportable securities under section 
13(f), the universe should be expanded vastly and to a degree that the SEC 
could publish a short list of security types that would remain non-
reportable. 
Third, timing must be adjusted, although it is arguably the most 
difficult issue to deal with cleanly.  In order to provide investment 
managers enough time to capitalize, at least in part, on their research, near 
immediate disclosure is not a workable solution.  The quarter-end-plus-
forty-five-days timeframe is certainly long enough, but is altogether 
arbitrary.  In February 2013, the New York Stock Exchange and others 
petitioned the SEC to change the guideline to quarter-end-plus-two-days.197  
While the petition makes the valid point that quarter-end-plus-forty-five-
days renders the information stale in contemporary markets and worth little 
in the way of tracking an investment manager,198 this timeframe is just as 
arbitrary and, in cases where transactions occur at the end of the quarter, 
could be too short.   
A better model would be to require rolling “material change in 
holding” reports within a fifteen-business day reporting window.  Modeled 
after the public company material event disclosure requirement commonly 
known as Form 8-K,199 this flexible standard should provide fund investors 
and the investing public with information once it becomes material but 
would not burden the asset manager with filing positions that are of no 
consequence.  Once asset managers have accumulated a certain dollar 
amount of a given holding, they would be required to add that holding to 
their report and file it within three weeks.  The same amendment would be 
required if the holding fell below the dollar threshold.  Subsequently, if the 
position grew or shrunk by a predetermined increment, the reporting 
requirement would be triggered and the fifteen-day reporting window 
                                                                                                                          
196 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64 (2012).  
197 Whitney Kisling, NYSE Asks SEC to Shorten 13F Filing Period to 2 Days from 45, 
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 6, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-06/nyse-asks-sec-to-shorten-
13f-filing-period-to-2-days-from-45.html. 
198 Marie Cabural, NYSE Files Petition to Shorten 13F Filing Deadline, VALUEWALK (Feb. 7, 
2013), http://www.valuewalk.com/2013/02/nyse-files-petition-to-shorten-13f-filing-deadline/. 
199 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FORM 8-K: CURRENT REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 
15(D) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 (2012), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form8-k.pdf.  
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would begin.  For investment companies that have not crossed a trigger 
point with respect to any of their holdings in thirty business days, a 
periodic report would be due.   
This system would have the effect of increasing disclosure frequency 
only when relevant, and would be continuous enough to be of real value to 
the investor community at large while providing the management company 
enough time to make meaningful headway on a program of acquisition or 
dispensation.  At the time these measures were formulated, the SEC would 
have been concerned with the costs implied by such a potentially high rate 
of frequency,200 but advances in technology have decreased the burden of a 
reporting requirement as simple as this. 
If these changes were implemented and the results were tabulated in a 
more accessible format than the SEC’s cumbersome online document 
retrieval service (i.e., EDGAR),201 the information would be more readily 
usable, not only for investors and the market generally, but also for 
regulators concerned with systemic risk and dramatic shifts in capital 
allocation.  It is reasonable to hope that these changes would enhance the 
SEC’s policy development efforts and its investigatory work in fraud 
detection as well. 
B.  Develop and Promulgate a Clear and Strict Standard of Review for 
Granting Confidential Treatment 
The standard for exemption, as reviewed in Part II.B, should be revised 
to require an affirmative showing of likely and substantial imminent harm 
to the asset manager’s financial condition in order to obtain exemption 
from the reporting requirements.  The 1998 guidance letter and 2013 
guidance update on CT Requests left open the ways in which an 
institutional money manager can claim to be harmed by disclosure of the 
firm’s positions, provided that the harm is “substantial” and demonstrable 
by historical evidence of “market reaction” to public disclosure by that 
investment manager.202  Demonstrating that a “market reaction” could 
result in less favorable outcomes for the CT filer than would be likely if he 
were not required to disclose his positions is not a sufficient standard from 
the perspective of market efficiency and true fairness. 
The SEC should promulgate more defined standards aimed at 
advancing the spirit of disclosure pervasive throughout U.S. securities law, 
which detail the types of harm that are preventable by way of confidential 
treatment and define “substantial” in clearer terms.  These measures would 
                                                                                                                          
200 Filing and Reporting Requirements Relating to Institutional Investment Managers, Exchange 
Act Release No. 34-14852, 43 Fed. Reg. 26,700, 26,701 (June 22, 1978). 
201 Filings & Forms, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml (last 
visited Nov. 21, 2013). 
202 2013 GUIDANCE UPDATE, supra note 58, at 4; 1998 Guidance Letter, supra note 8, at *4. 
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help to limit the cases where confidential treatment is granted to those in 
which regulatory requirements, and not the underlying market dynamics 
attached to transparency in general, would be the principal source of the 
loss.  This requires separating the “purely regulatory” from those effects 
that are grounded in economic substance.  The burden of making the 
distinction should be on the CT requester.  This would help to make the 
cases where confidential treatment is available less ambiguous, which, in 
turn, would increase competitive interests by ensuring that some 
institutions do not receive preferential regulatory treatment over others and 
making it less likely that an institution would successfully be able to obtain 
confidential treatment principally for the benefit of its own investment 
returns. 
Moreover, exemptions should not be granted for set periods of time up 
to one year, but rather for shorter increments that can be renewed upon 
subsequent application to the SEC.  Providing for prolonged and 
impenetrable immunity from disclosure does not allow the disclosure 
requirements to react to changing market conditions and investor status.  
Lastly, once exemption periods lapse, the SEC should publish the 
applications for exemption, redacted for otherwise privileged or 
confidential material, so as to build public understanding of how the 
decisional standard for exemption is made.  This would allow for ongoing 
and transparent precedent-building that would both further the interest of 
certainty among applicants and do much to advance perceptions of fair 
play among other smaller market participants and observers.  
C.  Enforce Civil Liability for Abuse of Confidential Treatment 
As discussed, there has only been one action against an investment 
management firm for alleged section 13(f) malfeasance.203  The action was 
related to the failure to file over a period of more than three years and 
resulted in a cease and desist order and a civil penalty of $100,000.204  
Quattro, the hedge fund manager subject to the fine, had assets under 
management of approximately $900 million.205  Outside of this slap on the 
wrist, the unqualified lack of reported enforcement actions for failure to 
properly file or for abusing the exemption process illuminates the 
diminished extent to which the SEC polices Form 13F filings.  While there 
is no doubt that the Commission has authority to prosecute for failing to 
file or for willful material misstatements and omissions,206 the exemption 
process has never been the subject of SEC enforcement.   
                                                                                                                          
203 Quattro Global Capital, LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 56,252, Investment Advisers Act 
Release No. 2634, 2007 WL 2471810 (Aug. 15, 2007). 
204 Id. at *1, *3–4. 
205 Id. at *1. 
206 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012). 
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Because any strategic use of the exemption provision to selectively 
disclose holdings is potentially manipulative of markets and takes 
advantage of information imbalance to the detriment of the public and for 
the benefit of enriching the manager, civil liability should arise in cases 
where exemption is granted and it later comes to light that it was not 
warranted.  The SEC could easily conduct a contextual examination of 
applications during the on-site examinations of investment managers 
already conducted by its Office of Compliance Inspections and 
Examinations (“OCIE”) division.207  The SEC should be expressly 
authorized to take civil action against those institutional investors for the 
amount they were enriched as a result of wrongfully withholding 
information from the market, plus interest.  
VII.  CONCLUSION 
When the federal government set out to regulate the public market in 
securities, it took it upon itself to provide all market participants with a 
better opportunity to protect themselves from fraud and loss and, 
conversely, to identify the prospect of gain.  It chose to do this by requiring 
the disclosure of certain information not otherwise readily available to all 
investors.  In the 1970s, the scope of relevant information deemed 
necessary to secure an equalized opportunity was expanded to include the 
holdings of institutional investment firms, because it was decided that 
transparency and fairness ultimately trumped the interests of pure 
competition.  Section 13(f) was born as a result, but has been long 
neglected.   
Fully realized, the statute could make large strides toward protecting 
investors by accelerating the point at which the informational interests of 
the less informed investors are favored over those of the more informed.  
This information sharing would still allow investment managers the 
opportunity to act on their advantages, but not in perpetuity or until they 
have maximized their profits.  Instead, there would come a point when they 
must cede what might prove to be a meaningful residual opportunity to the 
public.  This would spur broader economic efficiency in financial markets 
and, more importantly, would better equalize opportunity for gain across 
all groups of participants, without regard to the status quo distribution of 
resources. 
At the same time, reporting exemptions act as a steam valve, ensuring 
that the regulatory regime does not unduly disincentivize important 
institutional investment research.  It remains, however, that section 13(f) 
CT Requests should be granted only in limited and extraordinary situations 
                                                                                                                          
207 National Exam Program, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/about/off
ices/ocie.shtml (last modified Aug. 19, 2013). 
 2013] PROVIDING EQUAL INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITY 805 
where demanding compliance with the reporting requirements would, in 
itself, cause losses.  Otherwise, information should be deemed reportable 
and the filing requirement should be enforced accordingly. 
The improvements to section 13(f) administration suggested in this 
Note would bring us dramatically closer to realizing the broader goals of 
securities regulation including, most notably, a fair and transparent public 
market in securities.  Because the changes would allow comprehensive 
access to institutional investor holdings data on controlled terms and in a 
way that strikes a balance between the institutional investors’ interest in 
concealing their strategic positioning and the public interest in efficient and 
accessible markets, a revamped section 13(f) could provide the public with 
a real opportunity to more readily understand the forces animating the 
pricing of public securities without undermining the benefits of conducting 
proprietary research in the first place.  Then, finally, it would be feasible to 
avoid the privatization of informational advantage in public markets and 
better provide fair opportunity consistent with the purpose of securities 
regulation and just society alike.  
